Lessons posted:

I'm not even sure what it would mean for short-term recall to be governed by the same process as language comprehension, (or whatever more reasonable example you want to provide). When you have two mental processes that operate differently in observable and quantifiable ways it only makes sense to categorize them as different processes, and really the most you could say is that one is a sub-process of the other or both are sub-processes of another process.

this sort of reasoning can only take you so far, and imo acts like a sort of surrogate for the type of knowledge (or perhaps more accurately/precisely, the transformation of knowledge) which is the goal of a scientific enterprise. by analogy you could describe the mouse's forelimb and the lizard's forelimb and describe them both taxonomically as having some shared purpose, but that wouldn't ever really lead you to the understanding that they have the same origin as the wing of the bird or bat. that requires having a more materialistic theory (in this case perhaps an understanding of how parts of the body of an organism can vary through descent)

Lessons posted:

The experimentation on this is actually much different from what you think. Studies of short-term recall present a variety of tasks: remembering digits, images of objects, short sentences, etc., and the recall capacity is consistent throughout.

I'm aware of the methods involved. Let's assume that each other knows at least this much or this will be a chore.

Lessons posted:

This, in itself, suggests that short-term recall operates separately from other mental tasks, like mathematical skill, object recognition and and language comprehension respectively. Perhaps you're still skeptical, but as far as I'm concerned that's compelling evidence.

I can't see how it does, or how this is compelling evidence. That's a fairly big assumption right there, maybe the biggest one. You can't tell me with any certainty that digit recall does operate separately from any other process, and likewise for any other process you can think of. I'm not claiming anything either way because there's simply no information about the structure of the mind that would allow us to make such a claim in either direction.

Lessons posted:

I'm not even sure what it would mean for short-term recall to be governed by the same process as language comprehension, (or whatever more reasonable example you want to provide). When you have two mental processes that operate differently in observable and quantifiable ways it only makes sense to categorize them as different processes, and really the most you could say is that one is a sub-process of the other or both are sub-processes of another process.

The purpose of my example was to show how even the most functionally disconnected processes cannot be proven to be distinct from one another. It was perfectly reasonable in that regard.

Something I didn't get into in the piece in order to keep it readable for non psych readers was the topic of experimental methods. I'll quote Uttal here because I think he says it best. He's talking about internal structure being inferred from behaviour, referring to criticisms made by Shallice (1988):

"Take, for example, Shallice's discussion of reductive uncertainty produced by system complexity. After tabulating and defining a variety of neural (or other) system organizations...he points out that it is impossible to choose between the different systems on the basis of the produced modules. However fundamental to many scientific and engineering enterprises, this conclusion is of course quite unpopular..."

By listing six different types of system organizations that could produce identical behavioral results even though they differ enormously in their internal structure, Shallice very effectively demonstrates the frailty of any conclusions that might be drawn about internal structure from behavioral findings."

"To be more specific, let us consider the six functionally equivalent types of systems listed by Shallice (1988, pp.249-253):

1. Modular systems. The brain is organized into a cluster of semi-independent, functionally specific modules that, when damaged, produce well-defined deficits.

2. Coupled systems. The brain is composed of individual modules that strongly interact, but that each have their own specific functions.

3. Systems having a continuous processing space. The brain appears to be representing specific functions which turn out to be simply different points on a continuum.

4. Systems of overlapping processing regions. The brain is made up of overlapping pairs of modules, with both modules in each pair partially representing the particular function under investigation.

5. Systems of semimodules. The brain is made up of strongly interacting modular regions, whose respective functions are really only statistical averages of the many inputs that impinge upon them.

6. Distributed and multilevel systems. The brain is organized such that its functions are widely distributed at different vertical and horizontal levels."

Quoting Shallice directly:

"Hence any empirical procedure that stands a reasonable chance of helping to uncover the functional characteristics of the system is likely to involve as many assumptions, as does the use of neuropsychological findings. (p.265)"

Making a claim about the mind's structure based on behavioural properties of mind is addressed pretty well here I think. Shallice identifies plausible and functionally identical organizational principles the mind could obey, none of which are supported or denied by any observational findings.

Lessons posted:

I'm not talking about short-term memory though, I'm talking about digit recall. In contemporary psychology it'd be called working memory capacity or executive functioning. Our understanding of digit recall hasn't been abandoned or replaced and if anything it was the catalyst for the development from mid-century conceptions of short-term memory to current conceptions of working memory.

Fair enough, though I'm not sure why that really matters. The discussion isn't about specific entities. It's about whether or not there's any justification for asserting that any of them, be they called digit recall or the phonological loop or just working memory.

I suggest if you're interested you read The New Phrenology, because Uttal presents a really interesting side by side comparison of various taxonomies up to the most recent ones, and it's pretty clear when reading that how inconsistent they are.

Lessons posted:

Yeah I would say this is probably the central disagreement between you and contemporary psychology. You're not presenting this fairly though because it's not a matter of psychologists' unwarranted assumptions and you standing in the default position, it's conflicting conceptions of the mind. "The mind cannot be observed through behavior" is itself an assumption, and one that all research psychologists reject implicitly, so if you want to do more than poke holes in existing psychological models, (which I'm all for, mind you), then you'll have to justify that assumption which is more a philosophical task than a scientific one.

I think it's the absence of an assumption. I'm simply saying, do not make claims about the mind you can't support. I don't know for certain if it's modular or not, if there are definable processes or not. Until we have more information to fill in the void between mind and behaviour, then this must be the default position.

You should also remember this piece was designed to present a particular issue in psychology to a lay audience rather than be some sort of all encompassing philosophical treatise on the mind. Like sure you can stretch this discussion in every direction, this is hardly the only theoretical issue with cognitive neuroscience, but we're getting away from the issue that I was trying to present to people who mostly don't have a background in experimental psychology.

Eklund et al posted:

In theory, we should find 5% false positives (for a significance threshold of 5%), but instead we found that the most common software packages for fMRI analysis (SPM, FSL, AFNI) can result in false-positive rates of up to 70%. These results question the validity of some 40,000 fMRI studies and may have a large impact on the interpretation of neuroimaging results.

overfire posted:

y'all should read delusions of gender by cordelia fine, it rips up cognitive neuroscience and is funny and engaging

thanks for the recommendation. i note this is on libgen in various formats, and also in the secret pdf subforum for rhizzone gold members.

Wellcome Trust prices £275 million Bond

Press release / Published: 20 May 2009

The Wellcome Trust, the UK’s largest and the world’s second largest charitable foundation funding biomedical research, today announces that it has priced £275 million of Guaranteed Bonds due 2021 (the “Bonds”). Barclays Capital, J.P. Morgan Cazenove and Morgan Stanley acted as joint bookrunners and joint lead managers of the issue.

Press release not for distribution, directly or indirectly, in or into the United States or to United States persons.

The issue priced at a spread over gilts of 115 basis points, the tightest corporate spread in Sterling bond markets for comparable tenor issues, since December 2007. The initial order book was more than three-and-a-half times over-subscribed.

The Wellcome Trust has over 20 years' experience of managing a highly diversified investment portfolio, valued at £12.2 billion at 31 March 2009, and continues to maintain a conservative approach to risk. In the 20 years since the portfolio's inception, it has delivered a 14 per cent net annualised return. In 2007, the Wellcome Trust was assigned Aaa (stable)/AAA (stable) ratings from Moody's and Standard & Poor's respectively.

Danny Truell, Chief Investment Officer of the Wellcome Trust, said: "We are delighted at the continued strong investor interest in the Trust and the strength of its portfolio. It has been our widely publicised strategy to review regularly market conditions and correspondingly, on occasion, to access the bond markets when circumstances are appropriate. We remain as committed as ever to our Aaa/AAA ratings from the agencies, and it is testament to the strength of our financial position that we have seen such strong demand for this bond."

The issuing entity for the Bonds will be Wellcome Trust Finance plc, a special purpose vehicle incorporated in England and Wales, and the Bonds will be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed pursuant to the terms of a guarantee given by the Wellcome Trust. The Bonds will be offered to investors outside the United States in accordance with Regulation S under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

english charitable trust law is not really what most people think it is lol

tears posted:

Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller

fucking lol every time some aristocratic british ghoul comes up they have a grotesque name to match their grotesque actions

tears posted:

english charitable trust law is not really what most people think it is lol

im sure there has been stuff published on this but its interesting how it seems that in uk (and elsewhere?) charitable tax exempt status has developed historically as a means to allow certain capitalist businesses, in the case of the welcome trust finance-capital investment to the tune of 20+ billion on one side and investment in capitalist production of scientific research as a commodity on the other, to dodge paying into the collective pot for managing and maintaining class rule because they contribute independently to the "general effort"; like the three largest british charities, wellcome, Garfield Weston fOundation, church of england are all relativly large "charitable" finance-capitalist businesses, engaged in direct competition with other capitalists; the only thing that differentiates them from the other capitalists is their "charitable activities" whether thats investing in the production of scientific research or in godtalk

lo posted:

hasn't this idea been floating around for decades? like it used to be that 'something' was affecting the orbit of pluto and they came up with the concept of planet x, which i thought had been mostly discredited but this sounds like the same thing again, just in a different place

i mean insofar as it's the same general method, trying to explain why observed bodies behave the way they do when observations don't conform to existing models. then they find the object based on successful predictions and/or improved technology & techniques for detecting it, or they change the model based on other work, or they find another explanation for it. in the meantime, people argue over whether the papers that predict the object are sound or not. it's a lot of how planetary science works.