A fighter from the Free Syrian Army was helped after he was hit by sniper fire. A spokesman for the Free Syrian Army said that more than 100 soldiers defected Saturday, bringing three tanks along with them.

Iraq insurgents reject sending arms, fighters to Syria

Two Islamist militant groups in Iraq have rejected a call by al Qaeda to aid Syrian rebels, saying sending weapons and fighters across the border would only worsen the conflict. The Islamic Army in Iraq, composed of Sunni Arabs and former Iraqi army officers said it would support the Syrians morally in their fight against Assad, but would not dispatch fighters. A senior leader told Reuters on Wednesday:

We are against sending fighters, money and weapons to Syria. We are waiting for the Syrian people to decide their fate but we are supporting their aspirations morally. We do not want to interfere so as not to allow anyone to steal their revolution as al Qaeda has done. We don’t want to give the regime a pretext that can be used against the rebels.

Iraq said last week it had reinforced security along its Syrian border to prevent arms smuggling, after reports that weapons and fighters were crossing into Syria’s 600 km border with Iraq. Iraqi officials and arms dealers have reported an influx of weapons and Sunni Muslim insurgents into Syria from Iraq, but so far it has not seemed to be an organised and sustained flow. Sheikh Khalid al-Ansari, a senior leader with the al-Rashideen Army, said his group supported the fall of Assad but warned that arming Syria’s opposition would create an increasingly sectarian conflict. Ansari told Reuters:

We support the Syrian revolution and the fall of the Assad regime 100%. But we do not accept sending weapons, money and fighters to Syria because this will lead to the creation of a sectarian war that will target innocent people similar to what happened in Iraq and we do not want to repeat the same experiment.

http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-insurgents-reject-sending-arms-fighters-to-syria

Insurgent group chief arrested on Syria-Iraq border

Iraqi security forces on Wednesday arrested the head of Ansar al-Sunna, a Sunni insurgent group said to be linked to Al-Qaeda, the counter-terrorism chief for Anbar province said. Brig-Gen al-Dulaimi told AFP:

Iraqi forces today arrested the leader of Ansar al-Sunna, Walid Khaled Ali, as he tried to illegally infiltrate into Iraqi territory from Syria. He tried to cross on foot near Al-Walid border post into Anbar province in western Iraq. He was one of the most prominent suspects for terrorism cases. He killed many of the sons of Anbar and fled to Syria after the announcement of the tribal fight against Al-Qaeda in 2007.

Ansar al-Sunna is a Salafist group that has claimed several attacks against US and Iraqi security forces. It is an offshoot of the Kurdish group Ansar al-Islam. Dulaimi said the group is part of the Islamic State of Iraq, Al-Qaeda’s front organisation here. Iraq’s interior ministry meanwhile said on Monday:

Border guards were able to fend off groups of smugglers and infiltrators who were trying to cross the border from Syria into Iraq.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h5624Ov0UOJB5BvzB9J_uisUdnlw

When the Entire Planet is Against the Revolution

"I have seen the tree, but the roots are elsewhere." - Indian proverb.

Whether from the helms of the Syrian regime or through the "opposed" western media such as Al Jazeera and its helms in the Arab world, the hegemonic representation of the Syrian revolution is that of a world divided into two camps and no other. On one side, there are "the revolutionaries" and their free army, "neo-Ottoman" Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—at the heart of which is Qatar and its prince—and with the United States, Europe, and Israel in the background. On the opposing side, there is the Asad regime in Syria, Iran and the Lebanese Hizbullah—the “anti-imperialists”—with Russia and China in the background.

At first glance, the Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council seem to confirm nothing but such a narrative. The assumption in the Syrian case is that this is an "anti-imperialist/obstructionist" stance against western "imperialist" military intervention. More importantly, this assumption and the corresponding narrative are produced by both of the two camps. However, there is a more comprehensive reality than this dominant narrative. This reality is apparent to all who desire a deeper understanding of the issues: one that goes beyond the mere surface of things. Consequently, it is possible to look beyond today's game of mirrors, which—one must admit—works so well for parts the Arab left to the degree of blatant right-wing crudeness that can be summarized as "giving a face lift" to the "obstructionism" by means of leftist lingo. This game of mirrors also taints the western "anti-imperialist" leftist currents, most of which excel only in identity politics. They are oblivious to the fact that fighting fascist oppression was and continues to be an inseparable part of what it means to be a leftist, and that demanding justice for the Syrian people must itself be at the heart of being a leftist. However, it appears that each and every one of these currents prefers the continuity of Iranian and Syrian authoritarianism for the sake of endlessly reproducing both themselves and their discourses. For the existence of these two, the (pseudo) "anti-imperialists" and the authoritarian regimes, is justification for the existence of a type of left that speaks only of Palestine so as not to speak of anything else.

There are substantive indicators of the fictional nature of this narrative. For starters, both Hizbullah as well as the Zionist entity pray night and day these days that Asad will get out of his dilemma "alive." What are the implications of the overlap between Israel and Hizbullah in supporting the Syrian regime getting out of "trouble," each of them for their own reasons? In addition, is it not suspicious that supposed archenemies such as Iran and Israel agree on the survival of the Syrian regime when it was previously assumed that the antagonism between the two was absolute and permanent "until the day of judgment?" Furthermore, how do we make sense of a glaring understanding in Iraq—which remains occupied—between US imperialism and Iranian hegemony, which turned Iraq into both a total US colony as well as a theocratic Iranian semi-colony? Or how do we understand the excellent relations between the leaders of Libya—the new colony—and Iran, which did not appear to have a problem with the NATO bombing that resulted in over sixty thousand deaths in an Arab—and Muslim—country for the sake of enthusiastic relations with the "new" leadership there? Finally, how do we understand this sudden affection of US imperialism for the Syrian people, when the former is primarily responsible for the larger part of the predicament that the Arab peoples—including the Syrian people—suffer from today: the persistence of the authoritarianism of regimes (spanning from the ocean to the gulf) for over half a century and which is integrally connected to Israel's existence? How do we believe that the United States, which supports the renewed military fascism in Egypt in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood, is itself calling for freedom and democracy for the Syrian people?

The truth is that there is a fair amount of irrationality in the hegemonic reading of international politics vis-à-vis Syria. The dominant proposition overlooks the political and economic interests of the different players as well as the typical revolutionary calculations of the relationship between what can be done and what can be achieved. At best, this hegemonic reading views international politics through an ethical lens. At worst, it views them through a Manichean lens inspired by the writings of neoconservatives of the Bush Junior era. In the latter, the climactic battle is one against “the Axis of Evil,” which includes Syria and China. This dominant right-wing discourse—currently advanced under the name of “liberalism”—contains an implicit collapse in the distinction between on the one hand, both Russia and China in 2011, and on the other hand, Stalinist Soviet Union as well as Maoist China.

Naturally, one does not wonder about the existence of this dominant narrative in the helms of the regime, for this two-camp view is part of the regime's known ideological toolkit. However, we can see beyond this view by looking at the "leadership of the revolution.” I am referring here to the Qatari-funded, Turkish-based, French-supported Syrian National Council (SNC). It seems that the members of this council do not practice revolutionary politics for the sake of steering the Syrian revolution and its success towards safe heavens, but instead— and for the casual observer—their work vacillates between Facebook writings and media acrobatics. They insist on preaching at the incredible people that are being killed everyday, promising "the approaching salvation from the criminal regime." Furthermore, they do this without explaining to these people—and these are the very people of "the new Syria"—what political steps they are intent on taking other than endlessly imploring Russia and China to "not deploy" their veto. Those in the “National Council” ought to instead be honest with their people. They should tell them that if things continue as they currently are, it is very possible that the Syrian regime will repress the revolution to no end and save itself. Therefore, they should open up a serious dialogue without restrictions on what options are available. Certainly, internal factors will ultimately determine the lifespan of a regime that is continuously under strain, particularly in the economic sense. However, one must take into account that the deterioration of the economic situation in and of itself does not inherently entail the political or actual collapse of the regime, something which might take a very long time. Alternatively, something sudden could happen and transform the current situation, be it in the interest of the regime or not. In any case, one does not understand what this "revolutionary" leadership has done to prevent the killing of these people—women, children, and elderly, in besieged Homs today—except waste time on discussing a return to the Arab delegation in order to investigate the facts, as if there are facts that need investigation. All of this is happening while the delegation itself is headed by a Sudanese war criminal general that has increasingly prolonged both its work and the life of the regime.

Let us look at the decision to call Friday the "Friday of Russia Kills Our Children," which was "democratically" voted on through Facebook. It is not clear, for example, how one can consider such a vote to be representative even of the majority of Syrians opposed to Asad, especially since at many times such voting is directed "from above," and is itself affected by political elements within the “National Council” as well as some supporters of the council from the Arab Gulf states. Such naming appears to express suicidal political choices with respect to the revolutionary mobilization. These choices need to be discussed and questioned before it is too late, especially in the context of the ongoing comfortable international position of the Syrian regime, which appears to have regained some of its internal momentum in the latest phase even if this is always subject to change. Discussing and questioning these political choices is a duty for anyone who is keen on the interest of the Syrian people and their aspirations for freedom and dignity.

The first step to understanding what is happening is to do away with the illusion—which is continuously produced by US thinktanks—that Russia is both a corrupt and "failed" state. In particular, we can point to the unconscious habit of inserting the phrase "Russian mafias" when discussing Russia today: representing it as a "state of gangs" rather than a powerful modern state within which decisions related to national interests are made exactly as they are in the United States of America. In addition, such decisions can be on target or miss the mark in terms political objectives, also like the United States. The simple and very rational response to this illusion about Russia is the recognition that even if Putin's Russia is no longer today the now-extinct empire of the Soviet Union, it is nevertheless a great power—even if it certainly is not the greatest power—and invariably has a set of geostrategic calculations vis-à-vis its national security as well as its political and economic influences in the world. The same is the case for China. We can therefore deduce that it is to be expected, even natural, that Russia would seek to protect its interests in the Arab world from military bases and economic zones. These interests have traditionally been secured by the Baath regime in Syria as a result of the latter being a historic ally of the former. This is especially so given that Syria is Russia’s last direct stationing position on the Mediterranean.

But no! None of this appears to be factoring into the calculations of the “revolutionary leadership.” What we do see instead is the recurring state of surprise, even one of recurrent "moral" condemnation, by some elements of the National Council. Such a reaction is exclusively based on a faulty analysis of Russia’s maneuvers, which are otherwise very transparent to any rational person. Russia acts in accordance to the preservation of its interests and not in admiration of either the massacres committed by the Syrian regime or the consequences of its stance on the issue, which of course has made it less popular in the eyes of many Syrians mesmerised by media outlets that support the revolution. All this is to say that it has become quite clear that the council members sleep, eat, and drink in western states as well as the hotels of their Arab colonies. Conversely, the Russians—who are most influential in the security and military institutions of the Syrian regime and the latter’s regional connections—are in an unenviable position. They are forced to support a regime that is progressively losing its internal legitimacy. The Russians have no alternative option at this particular juncture because it is difficult for them to believe that the triumph of an elite that desires to rid itself from the present Syrian regime—an elite that is not prepared to provide any guarantees regarding Russian national interests—will mean anything other than the expansion of US-European influence in the region and the converse suffocating shrinking of the Russian strategic zone. This is especially so given that members of the council have cursed the Russians and the Chinese so frequently that they have greatly affected both revolutionary public opinion and the coordinating committees. This has also been expressed by the crowds shown on Al Jazeera, which in the past months have developed a weekly folkloric practice of burning Russian and Chinese flags. Thus instead of revolutionary political action that would attract Russian and Chinese support for the revolution from the start, the rhetoric of "shame on Russia and China" persists in the hegemonic media.

After all the regime repression that has transpired and is ongoing, it has become a given—from the Russian point of view—that a segment of those in the revolutionary leadership have become part of the western toolkit by virtue of the former's regional linkages and commitments, from Qatar all the way to Turkey. Until action is taken to change this, the reason for the current state of affairs should be understood after seven months of the SNC's existence. Therefore, the following central questions emerge: how can one accept the reality that a "revolutionary" leadership—that is supposed to garner all possible political support for the revolution and shorten the life of the regime in its current state—does not possess enough wisdom in dealing with the interests of the great power that is most capable of affecting the orientations of the current Syrian leadership? Why has it not been seriously suggested that a democratic transition in Syria can offer possibilities for a genuine cover for Russian interests in the region? Are these simply political mistakes or are they to be explained by a material link to elites of some international parties rather than others?

It is thus clear that there is a stark contrast between the peaceful revolutionaries on the ground and their leadership. There are revolutionaries that are not sectarian in the great majority of cases, who register eternal victories in the face of mass bloody repression. There is also the Abu-Milhim "revolutionary" leadership that, rather than working in politics, lives outside the realm of rational calculations vis-à-vis international politics and has thus misguided the compass of revolutionary mobilization. It has in one way or another assisted in prolonging the life of the regime that kills every day. What remains is to emphasize that there should be no confusion by judging the peaceful revolution by virtue of the performance of its "inorganic" leadership. Instead, the peaceful revolution should be judged by the expressions of the Syrian coordinating committees, which are the closest representation of the desire of today's revolting Syrian people except when the coordinating committees are in turn reproducing the talk of their leadership. This is only possible if we take into account the very powerful effect of those that determine the editorial policy of Al Jazeera on the dominant framings of international politics in the public opinion of the revolution.

It is clear that the United States of America has no actual problem with the survival of the regime in Syria despite everything the former proclaims to the contrary. However, members of the council do not base their political calculations on the intentions and interests of the United States. Rather, the members of the council base their political calculation only on what the United States declares: an imperial humanitarian discourse constructed around the call for democracy and the freedom of capital. The United States and Israel have no problem whatsoever with the survival of the Syrian regime. There is also a very real possibility that they are actually on the side of the regime and are working to undermine the revolution. We have yet to see anything other than US verbal, pictorial, and cinematic support for the Syrian revolution. We see no genuine material support after more than eleven months of daily killing. Furthermore, the western verbal acrobatics always end with placing "fault with the Russians." After all this, one should ask: in whose interest is it that the mantra of "the West and the United States are with the revolution” is everywhere to be found?

The only thing achieved by the United States through its current stance on the Syrian revolution—and its blaming of everything on the Russian and Chinese veto—is appealing to greater numbers of Syrians and the development of increasing hostility amidst the Syrian people towards Russia and China. This is a political gain that is significant to the United States; one that it is satisfied with today. From its perspective, there is nothing wrong with the country drifting into civil war. Such a situation would advance US interests as well as those of Israel much more than democracy in Syria would. The game of mirrors that is being played today is based on a central illusion: western military intervention in Syria.

In reality, there was never any intention of military intervention in Syria as there was in Libya. This is despite all the propaganda to such effects as well as that which opposed it. The largest indicator of this is the ultimate fate of Turkish foreign policy on Syria, which months ago suddenly fizzled out. We should recall at this point that Turkey is a NATO member state and its military leadership has repeatedly stated that it has no intentions of attacking Syria. This means a lot, especially when we recall that Turkish foreign policy in its broadest sense is an extension of US policies in the region.

Between Americans that support Asad under the table and claim the opposite after more than 7500 martyrs, Russians, Chinese, and Iranians that support Asad and declare it openly, and members of the SNC that have built an action program based on the sweet claims of US rhetoric while the former's conduct does nothing but prolong the life of the regime and sabotage the revolution, it is clear today that the Syrian revolutionaries are facing a criminal regime that confronts them with murder on a daily basis, and a revolutionary leadership that operates completely outside any real understanding of politics—irrespective of whether this is a result of good or bad intentions. It remains to be stated that the first step in revolutionary political action is acknowledgement of reality, no matter how harsh it is: today, the entire planet is against the Syrian revolution. Only after this admission can revolutionary political action begin.

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4470/when-the-entire-planet-is-against-the-revolution

ZAKARIA: I had Martin Dempsey on the program last week, and he said when talking about Syria, it’s very different from Libya, and it really doesn’t make sense at this point for the US to arm the rebels. Would you agree with that?

BRZEZINSKI: Well, it’s not a question of whether I agree with that, but my approach would be somewhat differently shaped or defined than the one we’re pursuing right now. I would argue for the position that we will support anything that the Turks and the Saudis jointly contrive because they’re our friends in the region, they’re responsible, they’re very interested, and they have the capacity to play a decisive role. We can then back them if they do it. But I certainly wouldn’t get out front.

ZAKARIA: Isn’t what’s happening in Syria, though, a kind of proxy cold war, with the Iranians supporting the regime and the Saudis increasingly supporting the opposition?

BRZEZINSKI: Yes. It’s even more complicated because the Israelis also have an interest, and they certainly don’t have an interest in a strong, united Syria again reemerging, although that’s rather unlikely these days in view of what has happened. But we shouldn’t be careless in any comparisons between Assad and Gadhafi. Gadhafi was far more vulnerable than Assad is. I think it’s far from clear yet that Assad can, in fact, be overthrown at this stage.

ZAKARIA: Really? The Syrian government has been pretty brutal. Will that brutality work?

BRZEZINSKI: Well, unfortunately, you know, brutality very often in history and throughout the world works. But I would be very much guided by the Turks and the Saudis. The Turks have a regional role to play. They’re assuming that role. They have intelligent leadership. They have been trying. I think we should back them. But the choice of how to act, and particularly if one is to be engaged in some fashion militarily, I think it has to be made first by them and also the Saudis, and not first by us.

What is with Brezezinski, he's like a movie villain who can't help but reveal his master plan when he thinks he's got the protagonist cornered.

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1202/26/fzgps.01.html

Syrian rebels want peace with Israel

Labor Party Knesset Member Isaac Herzog says Syrian opposition leaders have told him they want peace with Israel after Assad falls. Herzog said Wednesday that the Syrian opposition wants to “be friends” with Israel. He refused to name his sources because he said they fear retribution by Assad. He said they are aligned with the main rebel factions in Syria. There was no confirmation from the Syrian opposition figures to Herzog’s remarks. Herzog, who currently serves on the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, said Israel should supply medical and humanitarian assistance to the rebels. However, he ruled out military aid. Herzog, who met with Syrian exiles in Washington last year, already said previously that Israelis should listen to Syria’s rebels and not rule out a future relationship. He said at the time:

We in Israel often complain that they don’t know us and don’t understand us. We should know that we too do not possess sufficient understanding of our neighbors, and when it comes to Syria we see total ignorance. Following these and other meetings, I can say that what’s happening there does not resemble any other change taking place in our region. The Syrians are a secular nation comprising a fascinating coalition of ethnicities. In my view, following the Assad era there is a chance for positive processes vis-à-vis Israel as well, and they will require us to meet the challenge.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4196944,00.html

tpaine posted:
haha some of them are the same person

It makes no difference to me whether you are pro or anti. It’s a pathetic waste of time. Why don’t you devote your precious mind to the fact that there are al Qaeda teams in Lebanon claiming that Hezbollah is defending Israel? I know you will want to wriggle out of this, Tom. Why don’t you admit the truth, that the entire Sunni radical movement is a product of Saudi intelligence, developed and maintained under the tutelage of the CIA, and that it is serving the USraeli imperial coalition? After all, Tom, you aren’t in the middle east any more; they aren’t going to come to your home and blow your head off, any more than they are going to assassinate the staff of InfoWars.com, who have been talking about “al CIA-duh” for ten years. As far as I can see, your website is full of irrelevant gibberish. Why?

tpaine posted:
whose calling you tom without making a fat/digestive problem/buffet joke

seems alien to me

http://niqnaq.wordpress.com/2012/03/05/sigh

tpaine posted:
son of nagnig? jesus what racist shit are you into these days tom. btw you're like half redman because of your stretch marks, you aren't really all white

change my name to Eats Like Bear

Crow posted:
As far as I can see, "irrelevant gibberish" is a bad thing. Why?

please post on that site lol

The guy who runs al Jazeera’s Syrian coverage is the brother of a SNC bigwig

In Syria, al Jazeera’s Credibility Implodes

by PETER LEE

Over the last couple days the Syrian army has moved into the Baba Amr district of Homs.

The action is Syria’s Tiananmen.

The Western shorthand for Tiananmen is “authoritarian regime reveals its true monstrous face to the world and its own citizens by trampling on helpless pro-democracy demonstrators.”

Maybe so, but in the Chinese official political lexicon Tianenmen was “a demonstration of state power against a dissident group meant to illustrate the absolute authority of the state and the utter marginalization of the protesters.”

On February 25, I wrote this about the Homs endgame in Asia Times:

“Then there is Homs or, more accurately, the Baba Amro district of Homs, which has turned into a symbol of resistance, armed and otherwise, to Assad’s rule.

“Assad’s Western and domestic opponents have put the onus on Russia and China for enabling the Homs assault by their veto of the UN Security Council resolution, a toothless text that would have called for Assad to step down.

“However, the significance of the veto was not that it allowed Assad to give free rein to his insatiable blood lust for slaughtering his own citizens, as the West would have it.

“The true significance of the veto was the message that Russia and China had endorsed Assad as a viable political actor, primarily within Syria, and his domestic opponents, including those holding out in Baba Amro, should think twice before basing their political strategy on the idea that he would be out of the picture shortly thanks to foreign pressure.

“It is difficult to determine exactly what the government’s objectives are for Baba Amro. Hopefully, they are not simply wholesale massacre through indiscriminate shelling.

“Recent reports indicate that the government, after a prolonged and brutal softening-up, has decided to encircle the district, send in the tanks, and demonstrate to the fragmented opposition that ‘resistance is futile’, at least the armed resistance that seems to depend on the expectation of some combination of foreign support and intervention to stymie Assad and advance its interest.

“Whatever the plan is, the Chinese government is probably wishing that the Assad regime would get on with it and remove the humanitarian relief of Homs from the “Friends of Syria” diplomatic agenda.

…

“The message that Syria and China hope the domestic opposition will extract from Homs in the next few weeks is that, in the absence of meaningful foreign support, armed resistance has reached a dead end; it is time for moderates to abandon hope in the local militia or the gunmen of the FSA and turn to a political settlement.

“To Syria’s foreign detractors, the message will be that the genie of armed resistance has been stuffed back into the bottle thanks to “Hama Lite”; and the nations that live in Syria’s neighborhood might reconsider their implacable opposition to Assad’s continued survival.”

I think this interpretation of events is pretty spot on.

And I wish somebody would address the issue of who were the 4000 who stayed to the end in Baba Amr, “a working class district of 100,000”: Was it the core of the resistance? People who couldn’t or wouldn’t leave when the Syrian army tightened the noose? Any second thoughts on that botched exfiltration of that Sunday Times reporter that got him out a couple days before the Syrian army moved in (and moved the journalists out) but apparently got 13 people killed?

Was Homs a) a carnival of slaughter unleashed by a madman against his own citizens? b) a bloody exercise in Fallujah-style collective punishment meant to terrify Syria’s Sunni majority into submission? c) a brutal and effective coordinated military/security/political/diplomatic campaign meant to isolate and marginalize the rebels and convince Syrians that the insurrection has no hope of foreign succor or domestic success?

Inquiring minds want to know.

It looks like they won’t find out from al Jazeera.

The main event, or what should be the main event, for Western observers of Syria is the messy implosion of Al Jazeera’s credibility. Somebody disgruntled with the diktat of channel management that the Syrian revolution (at least the SNC version of it) “must be televised” leaked some raw footage of Homs coverage and interviews staged for maximum anti-regime effect.

As’ad AbuKhalil, proprietor of the Angry Arab newsblog, hails from the atheist/Marxist/feminist quadrant and is no friend of the Bashar regime. He had this to say about recent trends in programming on Syrian state TV:

“It seems that Syrian regime had agents among the rebels; or it seems that the Syrian regime obtained a trove of video footage from Baba Amru. They have been airing them non-stop. They are quite damning. They show the correspondent or witness (for CNN or from Aljazeera) before he is on the air: and the demeanor is drastically different from the demeanor on the air and they even show contrived sounds of explosions timed for broadcast time…

“PS This is really scandalous. It shows the footage prior to Aljazeera reports: they show fake bandages applied on a child and then a person is ordered to carry a camera in his hand to make it look like a mobile footage. It shows a child being fed what to say on Aljazeera.”

Later in the day:

“This is rather explosive. You know how low Aljazeera has sunk when Syrian regime TV stations have a field day with the shoddy journalism and fabrication procedures of Aljazeera. It seems that people inside Aljazeera have leaked raw footage and pre-air reports to someone in Syrian regime TV. I am not surprised of the leak at all: I am in contact from people inside Aljazeera who are disgusted by the propaganda work of the network in the last few months. … I know how those things work and they know that I know. The footage that are being shown show staging of events of calling a civilian an “officer” in the Syrian army, of faking injuries and feeding statements to people before airtime, etc. Aljazeera seems to be writing its own professional obituary. I don’t know how it can really resurrect itself again. It is mortally wounded. I know that there are people in the network who are pained about what is happening but royal orders are royal orders in the network and no one dare to disobey. I am told that orders came down to the effect that no half-position would be tolerated and that categorical adoption of the Qatari foreign policy on Syria is a job requirement.”

Actually, information about Al Jazeera’s Syria biases had already reached the English language media on February 24 (and Syria watchers when Josh Landis posted it on his Syria Comment blog), when an article in al Akhbar reported on some e-mails hacked off al Jazeera’s servers by the Syrian regime’s “electronic army”:

“The major find to be made public was an email exchange between anchorwoman Rula Ibrahim and Beirut-based reporter Ali Hashem. The emails seemed to indicate widespread disaffection within the channel, especially over its coverage of the crisis in Syria.

…

“Ibrahim … protested that she had ‘been utterly humiliated. They wiped the floor with me because I embarrassed Zuheir Salem, spokesperson for Syria’s Muslim Brothers. As a result, I was prevented from doing any Syrian interviews, and threatened with transfer to the night shift on the pretext that I was making the channel imbalanced.’

“Ibrahim also spoke of how Syrian activists invited onto Al Jazeera use terms of sectarian incitement on air, ‘which Syrians understand very well.’

…

“They also confirmed an allegation Ibrahim had reportedly made in one of her emails: That Ahmad Ibrahim, who is in charge of the channel’s Syria coverage, is the brother of Anas al-Abdeh, a leading member of the opposition Syrian National Council. He allegedly stopped using his family name to avoid drawing attention to the connection.”

Yes, emphasis added. The guy who runs al Jazeera’s Syrian coverage is the brother of a SNC bigwig.

The requisite ironic coda (and what should be the obituary for al Jazeera as a serious news outfit, at least as far as its current Syrian coverage is concerned) is contained in this observation:

“However, the scoop did not attract the attention that had been hoped for. Like other official Syrian media, the channel is not widely watched and has suffered a loss of viewer confidence.

“Thus the report was barely noticed, and Al Jazeera itself completely disregarded it.”

Yes, news you can report just by walking into your newsroom; that’s too far for al Jazeera (and, probably CNN).